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MEASURING THE CHILLING EFFECT
BRANDICE CANES-WRONE† & MICHAEL C. DORF‡
Supreme Court doctrine grants special protection against laws that “chill” protected speech, most prominently via the overbreadth doctrine. The overbreadth doctrine permits persons whose own speech is unprotected to challenge laws that
infringe the protected speech of third parties. The Court has not generally applied
overbreadth and the other speech-protective doctrines to other constitutional rights
even though other rights could also be subject to a chilling effect. The case law
simply assumes that the chilling effect only acts on the exercise of speech, and that
this justifies treating speech differently from other rights.
We tested these assumptions with respect to abortion rights. By comparing
abortion rates with state laws over a two-decade-plus period, we found a statistically significant correlation between laws forbidding late-term abortions and the
reduction of not only late-term but also “near-late-term” abortions, i.e., abortions
in the roughly one month before the period in which abortions are forbidden. That
effect persists even after controlling for potentially confounding variables, such as
the number of abortion providers and pro-life public opinion. Moreover, the effect
is not limited to the year of enactment or associated with failed policy initiatives,
suggesting that the impact is due to the law itself rather than associated publicity.
These findings are consistent with, and strongly suggestive of, a chilling effect on
abortion providers and/or women seeking abortions. This result undermines the
implicit assumption that the chilling effect is unique to laws regulating speech and
vindicates the general proposition that laws can chill the exercise of constitutional
rights beyond their literal coverage.
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INTRODUCTION
Supreme Court case law provides robust remedies for parties
claiming violations of the right to freedom of speech based on the
† Donald E. Stokes Professor of Public and International Affairs and Professor of
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supposition that without such protections, people will self-censor.1
Even laws that do not directly target particular parties or that do so
unconstitutionally may “chill” their exercise of free speech. In economic terms, speech, or rather information, is a public good. An individual speaker, however, does not capture all of the value of speaking,
and so she typically will not risk incurring a substantial legal sanction
in order to reap the modest reward that comes to her from her
speech.2 The imbalance between risk and reward makes free speech
especially subject to overdeterrence.
Although the chilling effect may account for a wide variety of
speech-protective constitutional doctrines,3 it plays an express role in
overbreadth cases. The overbreadth doctrine permits litigants whose
own conduct is not constitutionally protected to challenge a law on the
ground that it chills the exercise of free speech rights by persons not
before the court.4 As a formal matter, such overbreadth challenges
can only be brought by parties claiming violations of the right to free
speech or, in some slightly broader formulations, First Amendment
rights generally.5 Some commentators argue, however, that the
Supreme Court has in fact permitted overbreadth challenges beyond
the First Amendment context, including challenges to laws restricting
abortion.6 Doctors receive relatively small personal benefits for performing each additional abortion relative to the stiff criminal penalties
that could result from a charge that the abortion did not fall within the
bounds of legally permissible circumstances. As a result, laws
1 See Daniel A. Farber, Commentary, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice
and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 568 (1991) (“Many First Amendment
doctrines reflect the fear that certain laws overdeter speech and thus lead to a suboptimal
amount of total information disseminated in society.”); see also United States v. Williams,
553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (“[T]he threat of enforcement of an overbroad law deters people
from engaging in constitutionally protected speech, inhibiting the free exchange of ideas.”).
2 See Farber, supra note 1, at 570 (“Speech is more likely to be chilled than other
activities because most of its benefits are not captured by the speaker.”).
3 See id. at 568–79 (using the chilling effect to explain free speech limits on defamation
liability, vagueness, overbreadth, time, place, and manner restrictions, hate-speech
prohibitions, and more).
4 See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (characterizing the First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine as an exception to “traditional rules of standing”).
5 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (“[W]e have not recognized an
‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.” (citing Schall
v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 n.18 (1984))).
6 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 235, 268–79 (1994) (explaining that case law permits overbreadth challenges in more
circumstances than those officially recognized); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction
About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 946–47 (2011) (“Prior to [2006] virtually
all of the abortion cases reaching the Supreme Court involved facial attacks in which the
Court accepted this framing of the question presented, without pausing to ask whether the
challenger could succeed on an as-applied theory.”).
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restricting abortion may chill doctors from performing legal as well as
illegal abortions.
The Supreme Court has not made any attempt to detect or measure the chilling effects that ostensibly support its free speech doctrines. Is the chilling effect a real phenomenon? Does it affect only
First Amendment rights or other rights as well? After briefly setting
forth the doctrinal lay of the land, this Article reports on our efforts to
measure the chilling effect of laws that restrict abortion.
We chose abortion rights rather than free speech rights for this
study in order to test the uniqueness claim in the Court’s jurisprudence: Finding a chilling effect for abortion would undercut the tacit
assumption that free speech rights are uniquely subject to being
chilled.7 Conversely, a negative finding would either support the
uniqueness claim or undercut the claim that any rights, including First
Amendment rights, are subject to a substantial chilling effect. In
either event, the analysis will shed light on the scope of the chilling
effect. In addition, while we are not so naı̈ve as to discount the substantial role played by conflicting values in judicial evaluation of abortion laws, continuing uncertainty over the standard for evaluating
abortion challenges suggests that the Court might be receptive to
empirical evidence if and when it revisits these questions.8
Candor requires us to acknowledge that our focus on abortion
rights also reflects our assessment of the available data. To measure a
chilling effect on speech would require us to measure the amount or
quality of speech both before and after the enactment of a law
restricting speech. But so far as we could ascertain, such data have not
yet been collected and attempting to do so would raise difficult measurement questions.9 By contrast, for the last four decades, various
states have enacted numerous abortion-related restrictions, and
during that time, substantial data have also been collected on abortion
rates. We employ the variation across states to analyze whether laws
7 The Court has not, to our knowledge, stated that other rights are not vulnerable to a
chilling effect but, by confining the overbreadth doctrine to free speech cases, the doctrine
tacitly treats free speech as especially vulnerable. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
486 (1965) (“Because of the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression, we
have not required that all of those subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test
their rights.”).
8 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007) (noting but declining to resolve
longstanding tension in prior cases over the standard for assessing facial challenges to
abortion restrictions and rejecting the instant facial challenge on the facts before the
Court).
9 In their intriguing contribution to this symposium, Professors Ho and Schauer tackle
a related problem by looking at voting—a form of expression for which data do exist.
Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of Ideas, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1160 (2015).
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restricting abortion have a chilling effect on constitutionally protected
abortions that do not fall within the scope of the regulations.
Using data collected by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Guttmacher Institute, and our own research into
state legal materials, we tested whether the enactment of a state law
restricting late-term abortions affected the early-term, mid-term, lateterm, and overall abortion rate in that state. We found that late-term
abortion restrictions reduce not only late-term abortions, but also
“near-late-term” abortions, i.e., abortions in the roughly one-month
period before the period in which abortions are forbidden. Controlling for various other possible causes leads us to conclude that a chilling effect is the most likely explanation.
I
LEGAL BACKGROUND
Concurring in a 1952 ruling that invalidated an Oklahoma loyalty
oath for public employees,10 Justice Felix Frankfurter first identified
what has become known as the “chilling effect”: A substantial number
of persons subject to an overbroad law will not engage in constitutionally protected speech for fear that they will be prosecuted under the
law. They self-censor because they are chilled by the law, even though
the law is invalid, at least as applied to them.11 The Supreme Court’s
overbreadth doctrine is the clearest doctrinal response to the chilling
effect. It allows an exception to the general rule forbidding litigants
from raising the rights of third parties: A litigant whose own conduct
is not constitutionally protected may challenge a law as overbroad on
the ground that it chills the exercise of free speech rights by persons
not before the court.12
Academic commentators disagree about the justification for, and
scope of, the overbreadth doctrine. Henry Monaghan argues that the
overbreadth doctrine does not rest on the chilling-effect rationale at
all; in his view, everyone has a constitutional right to be judged by a
constitutionally valid rule of law, and so the overbreadth doctrine
simply reflects the fact that the Constitution forbids overly broad
laws.13 Although they agree with much of Monaghan’s analysis, other
10

Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
Id. at 195 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[I]nhibition of freedom of thought, and of
action upon thought, in the case of teachers . . . has an unmistakable tendency to chill that
free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice; it makes
for caution and timidity in their associations by potential teachers.”).
12 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (characterizing the First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine as an exception to “traditional rules of standing”).
13 Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 4–14.
11
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commentators disagree with his conclusion. For instance, one of the
authors of this Article contends that Monaghan’s account neither
explains the source of the ostensible right to be judged by a valid rule
nor reconciles it with the practice of severing invalid parts and applications of laws.14 Richard Fallon notes that case law does in fact rest
the overbreadth doctrine on the chilling effect, at least in part.15
Fallon has also argued that overbreadth and other facial constitutional
challenges are much more common in practice than the Supreme
Court formally recognizes.16 Although they disagree about the particulars, Monaghan, Fallon, and Dorf have all offered justifications that,
if accepted, extend the rationale for the overbreadth doctrine to other
kinds of constitutional claims besides free speech claims. Other
scholars assert that the Supreme Court doctrine concerning asapplied, facial, and overbreadth challenges is at best confused.17
Notwithstanding the case law confusion and academic debate,
Supreme Court cases clearly state that the chilling effect justifies a
distinctive overbreadth doctrine applicable to First Amendment cases
and inapplicable to other kinds of cases.18 The Court’s rationale is
partly normative and partly empirical. As a normative matter, First
Amendment freedoms have been said to occupy a “transcendent” role

14

Dorf, supra note 6, at 242–51.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 863–64,
867–70 (1991).
16 Fallon, supra note 6, at 917 (“[F]acial challenges to statutes are common, not
anomalous.”).
17 For a sample of the most thoughtful commentary on the topic, see Alfred Hill, Some
Realism About Facial Invalidation of Statutes, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 647, 657 (2002)
(defending the traditional, limited scope of facial challenges and arguing that “facial
invalidation as total invalidation adds nothing to the rights of persons whose conduct is
constitutionally protected, and is without legal effect as to persons whose conduct is not
constitutionally protected”); Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges
and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 388–95 (1998) (distinguishing
between overbreadth and “valid rule” facial challenges); Scott A. Keller & Misha Tseytlin,
Applying Constitutional Decision Rules Versus Invalidating Statutes In Toto, 98 VA. L.
REV. 301, 348–57 (2012) (maintaining that overbreadth attacks respond to the combination
of free speech doctrine’s complexity and the chilling effect); Gillian E. Metzger, Facial
Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 879–80 (2005) (juxtaposing the
doctrines governing facial attacks based on individual rights claims with those based on
federalism claims); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 1209, 1238 (2010) (suggesting that challenges to legislative action are necessarily
facial).
18 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (“In the First Amendment
context, however, this Court recognizes ‘a second type of facial challenge,’ whereby a law
may be invalidated as overbroad if ‘a substantial number of its applications are
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’” (quoting
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008))).
15

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\90-4\NYU404.txt

1100

unknown

Seq: 6

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5-OCT-15

9:02

[Vol. 90:1095

in our constitutional order.19 They are thus entitled to special
protections.
Two empirical claims implicitly underwrite the free speech overbreadth doctrine: first, that overbroad laws chill free speech rights;
and second, that overbroad laws do not chill other rights, or do not
chill other rights to the same degree that they chill free speech
rights.20 Although the case law does not delve deeply into why that
might be, the Court has asserted that the overbreadth “doctrine is
predicated on the sensitive nature of protected expression.”21 This
implies that other rights are less “sensitive,” i.e., less susceptible to
being chilled.
The risk/reward imbalance for persons subject to laws restricting
speech makes it plausible that free speech is vulnerable to a chilling
effect. But if that is the justification, the risk/reward imbalance makes
a chilling effect plausible in other areas, too. For instance, Derek
Schaffner suggests that the chilling effect may extend to the impact of
copyright laws on innovation and competition.22 Here, we hypothesize
that abortion rights similarly might be vulnerable to a chilling effect
because abortion restrictions alter the incentives of doctors. Accordingly, we set ourselves the task of testing for a chilling effect associated with abortion restrictions.
II
STUDY DESIGN
The field of abortion regulation provides potentially fertile
ground for testing a chilling effect because states enact new abortion
regulations in substantial numbers every year. For example, in 2013
alone, twenty-four states enacted fifty-two new abortion regulations.23
19 See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (“[T]he transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing ‘attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate
that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow
specificity’ . . . .” (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965))).
20 See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 610 (2004) (“Outside the[ ] limited settings
[of free speech and perhaps a handful of other contexts], and absent a good reason, we do
not extend an invitation to bring overbreadth claims.”).
21 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 (1982).
22 Derek J. Schaffner, Note, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Overextension of
Copyright Protection and the Unintended Chilling Effects on Fair Use, Free Speech, and
Innovation, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 148 (2004) (“Experience with the ‘anticircumvention’ provisions of the [Digital Millennium Copyright Act] demonstrates that the
statute reaches too far, chilling a wide variety of legitimate activities in ways Congress did
not intend.”).
23 NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. & NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. FED’N, WHO DECIDES?:
THE STATUS OF WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (23d ed.
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To assess whether laws affect the incidence of abortion beyond those
abortions that they actually target, we looked for abortion laws that
would enable an objective distinction between legal coverage and
measurable impact.
We identified laws restricting late-term abortions as one such possibility. These laws prohibit abortions either after: (1) the fetus
reaches viability outside the womb or (2) a specified number of weeks
of gestation. These laws do not and should not reach abortions in the
previous weeks of pregnancy. If there were no chilling effect, we
would expect restrictions on late-term abortions either to have no
impact on the abortion rate earlier in pregnancy or to shift the timing
of some abortions to earlier periods of the pregnancy because some
women who would have been inclined to wait for a late abortion
would be told by their doctors that they must have the procedure
before the law’s coverage period begins. In either event, absent a
chilling effect, the net impact of a late-term restriction would be to
increase the percentage of abortions in earlier weeks of gestation: A
few women might shift the timing of their abortions to an earlier
period and, even if none did so, by banning late-term abortions, the
law would prevent some late-term abortions entirely, leading to a
smaller denominator.
In considering late-term abortion laws, we analyzed postviability
restrictions as well as specific-week restrictions, such as laws proscribing abortions after twenty-four weeks. Postviability abortion bans
are constitutional so long as they contain an exception for circumstances in which the continuation of the pregnancy would pose a
threat to the life or health of the woman.24 Properly crafted laws forbidding postviability abortions are not necessarily “overbroad” as the
free speech case law uses that term.
Nonetheless, for purposes of testing the chilling effect,
postviability prohibitions can provide very useful information. These
laws may be overbroad because of how “viability” is defined.25 More2014), available at http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/download-files/2014-whodecides.pdf.
24 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973) (“If the State is interested in
protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that
period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.”); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (reaffirming the authority of states
to forbid postviability abortions with life and health exceptions). But see Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 141–43 (2007) (declining to invalidate a ban on one method of lateterm abortion even though the challenged law did not contain an exception for the health
of the woman).
25 See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390–97 (1979) (holding an abortionrelated statute unconstitutional because of its unclear definition of the term “viability”).
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over, even those state postviability prohibitions that are not overbroad allow us to measure whether a law that validly proscribes some
conduct—here, postviability abortions—also has the effect of
reducing constitutionally protected conduct—previability abortions.
Finally, as discussed in the Introduction, the chilling effect explains a
variety of free speech doctrines, not just overbreadth.26 Thus, testing a
chilling effect has potential consequences beyond the overbreadth
doctrine.
As revealed below in our data set, state prohibition of late-term
abortions is a fairly common legislative response to the limits that
Supreme Court case law places on state regulatory authority over
abortions. By looking at abortion rates before and after the enactment
of such laws within individual states, we can examine how changes in
state laws affect behavior regarding abortions. In other words, we can
assess how changes in late-term abortion laws in a given state affect
abortions in that state at different stages of pregnancy. If the late-term
laws are at all consequential, we would clearly see fewer abortions in
the third trimester or, depending on the particular law, from the specific gestational age after which abortions are prohibited; currently,
the strictest cutoff is at twenty weeks.27 However, in the absence of a
chilling effect, we should not observe fewer abortions in the “nearlate-term” of sixteen to twenty weeks, given that no law has an earlier
threshold than twenty weeks and that viability occurs at approximately twenty-four or twenty-five weeks.28 In fact, absent a chilling
effect, the percentage of abortions in the near-late-term period, out of
the total in the state, should increase. Likewise, assuming that lateterm restrictions induce women to seek abortions earlier in a pregnancy, the percentage (and number) of abortions prior to sixteen
weeks should also increase.
Since 1990, the CDC has published detailed data on the number
of abortions by state at different stages of gestation in the annual
26

See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-45.1 (West 2014). The next earliest cutoff is twenty-four
weeks. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12L–M (West 2014); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 442.250 (West 2014); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3211 (West 2014).
28 See Overall Outcome, EPIC URE , http://www.epicure.ac.uk/overview/overalloutcome/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2015) (listing survival rates for labor onset at different
periods of gestation); cf. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (“Viability is usually placed at about seven
months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.”). The best medical evidence
indicates that almost no viable births are possible at twenty weeks. Cf., e.g., Kate L.
Costeloe et al., Short Term Outcomes After Extreme Preterm Birth in England:
Comparison of Two Birth Cohorts in 1995 and 2006 (The EPICure Studies), BRIT. MED. J.,
Dec. 4, 2012, at 8 tbl.1 (finding survival to twenty-eight days in only 3% of live births at
twenty-two weeks).
27
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Abortion Surveillance Report.29 The state coverage is nearly complete, with data for forty-five states. We therefore have a reasonably
sized panel data set from which to test the impact of policy changes,
holding constant the state itself and a variety of additional controls.
While the CDC reports vary the gestational stages a bit from year to
year, the three categories of sixteen to twenty weeks, post-twenty
weeks, and below sixteen weeks can be calculated for each available
year of the report. Our key dependent variable is accordingly %16–20
weeks, which equals the percentage of abortions in weeks sixteen to
twenty of gestation out of the total number of abortions that year in a
given state. Additionally, for purposes of comparison, we conduct
tests with the analogous dependent variables %Over 20 weeks and
%Below 16 weeks.
The key independent variable, Late Term Restriction, equals 1 if
in that year the state had a restriction on late-term abortions,
including a prohibition on abortions beginning at twenty weeks,
twenty-four weeks, the third trimester, or postviability. To code these
policies, we consulted a variety of sources. The Guttmacher Institute
generously shared its annual State Policies in Brief: State Policies on
Later Abortions, which go back to 2004. For the earlier years, we
relied chiefly on published state legislative codes, available online and
for earlier years in the Cornell Law Library.
In supplemental analyses, we consider the possibility that the
impact of a late-term restriction may depend on whether the restriction involves fetal viability versus a specified time frame. For instance,
time-based restrictions could have a larger impact on near-late-term
abortions because the woman seeking the abortion (and the fetus’s
father) may have private information about the timing of the pregnancy that the physician lacks. Hence, a physician may be apprehensive about performing an abortion if a party could later claim with
some plausibility that an abortion had been performed at a period
prohibited by law.30 By comparison, the physician is more of an expert
than the parents on the viability of a fetus.
At the same time, other pressures may cause viability restrictions
to have a larger effect on near-late-term abortions. For example,
because of the inherent vagueness of the term “viability,” the physi29 CDC’s Abortion Surveillance System FAQs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/data_stats/Abortion.htm (last
updated Nov. 18, 2014).
30 Cf. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF AS OF FEBRUARY 1, 2015: STATE
POLICIES ON LATER ABORTIONS 1 (2015) (explaining that some state laws have been found
unconstitutional because they do not permit a physician to exercise judgment in
determining viability).
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cian might be wary of performing a near-viability abortion when regulated by a prohibition on postviability abortions. In extraordinary
cases, neonatal interventions can lead to the survival of a baby born as
early as twenty-two weeks.31 Combined with uncertainty about when
a pregnancy began and the measurement error of tools like fetal ultrasound, the vagueness of the viability line could itself lead to physician
apprehensiveness about performing abortions in the technically legal
period. In the supplemental regressions, Viability equals 1 if the
restriction prohibits abortions once the fetus can survive outside the
womb and 0 otherwise. Likewise, Time Limit is an indicator that
equals 1 if there is a specified time after which abortions are
prohibited.
Because factors other than late-term restrictions may affect a
pregnant woman’s decision about whether and when to seek an abortion, we include a number of control variables.32 Number of Providers
equals the number of hospitals, clinics, and physician offices in the
state that perform abortions. These data are from the Guttmacher
Institute State Data Center.33 Various studies show that provider
access increases the number of abortions.34 We also allow for the possibility that public opinion about abortion may affect the number and
timing of abortions within a state. We use state-level data on pro-life
versus pro-choice opinion collected by Canes-Wrone, Clark, and
Park.35 More specifically, Pro-Life Opinion equals the percentage of
survey respondents for that state and year who favor adopting further
restrictions on abortion or prohibiting it altogether.36
31 See Most-Premature Baby Allowed Home, BBC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2007, 10:33 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6384621.stm (telling the story of a baby who, due to
advances in neonatal care, survived after less than twenty-two weeks in the womb).
32 However, we observe the same substantive results even if no control variables are
included.
33 State Data Center, GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/datacenter/
trend.jsp# (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).
34 See, e.g., Rebecca M. Blank, Christine C. George & Rebecca A. London, State
Abortion Rates: The Impact of Policies, Providers, Politics, Demographics, and Economic
Environment, 15 J. HEALTH ECON. 513, 531–32 (1996) (attributing part of the decline in
abortion rates to the decreased availability of providers); James D. Shelton, Edward A.
Brann & Kenneth F. Schulz, Abortion Utilization: Does Travel Distance Matter?, 8 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 260, 262 (1976) (stating that when new facilities in parts of Georgia were
established, “the abortion-to-live-birth ratio increased by at least twice as much as it did in
the remainder of the state”).
35 Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom S. Clark & Jee-Kwang Park, Judicial Independence and
Retention Elections, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 211 (2012).
36 The data are based on recurring CBS News/N.Y. Times polls that, since 1989, have
asked respondents: “Which of these comes closest to your view? 1. Abortion should be
generally available to those who want it; OR 2. Abortion should be available but under
stricter limits than it is now; OR 3. Abortion should not be permitted?” Megan Thee,
Public Opinion on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS (Apr. 19, 2007, 3:41 PM), http://
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Controlling for pro-life public opinion allows us to distinguish
between two possible reasons why the enactment of a late-term abortion law might reduce the incidence of all abortions. If the late-term
abortion law either reflects or causes an increase in the public’s opposition to abortion, then a reduction in abortions would not necessarily
reflect a “chill.” Women would be having fewer abortions (at all
periods of pregnancy) because, after moral reflection, they decided
that they did not want to have abortions. Controlling for pro-life
public opinion helps distinguish between this possibility and the alternative that women are unable to have abortions despite wanting
them.37
Our third control, Partial Birth Abortion Restriction, accounts for
the influence that partial-birth abortion laws may have on the timing
of abortion decisions. “Partial-birth abortion” is a colloquial term for
the procedure medically known as “Intact Dilation and Extraction,”
which when legal, is used relatively rarely and is exclusively for second
trimester or later abortions.38 Over the past decades, states and the
federal government have limited the circumstances under which the
procedure is permitted. The Supreme Court invalidated a state partialbirth abortion ban in 2000,39 but, after a change in membership,
upheld a substantially similar federal partial-birth abortion ban seven
years later.40 Because the procedure is designed for later-term abortions, partial-birth abortion laws may affect the timing of abortions
independently of whether late-term abortions are restricted explicitly.
We gathered data on state partial-birth-abortion laws from a
variety of sources, including the Guttmacher Institute reports State
Policies in Brief: “Partial-Birth” Abortion Bans,41 state legal codes,
federal and state court rulings, and interest group reports.42 Partial
thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/04/19/public-opinion-on-abortion. For further details,
see Richard P. Caldarone, Brandice Canes-Wrone & Tom S. Clark, Partisan Labels and
Democratic Accountability: An Analysis of State Supreme Court Abortion Decisions, 71 J.
POL. 560, 564 (2009) (referencing these surveys); Canes-Wrone, Clark & Park, supra note
35, at 221 (discussing these surveys).
37 Correspondingly, we also test whether the results seem to be driven by the publicity
surrounding the passage of the law by comparing the impact at the time it was passed to
that in future years.
38 Julie Rovner, ‘Partial-Birth Abortion:’ Separating Fact from Spin, NPR (Feb. 21,
2006, 9:44 PM), http://www.npr.org/2006/02/21/5168163/partial-birth-abortion-separatingfact-from-spin (indicating that partial-birth abortions account for around 0.2% of abortions
in the United States).
39 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
40 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
41 GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF AS OF OCTOBER 1, 2014: BANS ON
“PARTIAL-BIRTH” ABORTION (2014).
42 For each jurisdiction-year in the database, we examined the current statutory code
for the jurisdiction, as well as archived print and/or online versions of the session laws for
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Birth Abortion Restriction equals 1 for the states and years that limited the practice of Intact Dilation and Extraction, and 0 otherwise.
While the analysis focuses on within-state change, some factors
may affect all states simultaneously. Most obviously, federal rulings
and laws about late-term and partial-birth abortions may influence the
timing and number of abortions. In addition, other state and federal
policies, such as welfare reforms, may affect the attractiveness of
keeping a baby versus terminating a pregnancy. To account for these
and other national factors, we include a set of year indicators.
The specification itself also holds constant the state. In particular,
we use what is called a “fixed effects” model, with the states as the
fixed effects. By doing so, any observed impact of the late-term
restrictions derives from within-state changes that occur at the time of
the legal change. For instance, it would be tempting to conclude that
late-term abortion laws reduce abortions in the sixteen- to twentyweek period simply because states with late-term restrictions have
fewer abortions in this period. However, these states may differ in
other important ways. By holding the state constant through the fixed
effects approach, we eliminate the possibility that our conclusions are
driven by unobserved interstate differences.
More formally, we estimate the following main model for each
state s and year t:
[1] %16–20 weeksst = a + b1 Late Term Restrictionst + b2 Number of
Providersst + b3 Pro-Life Opinionst + b4 Partial Birth Restrictionst
+ gYear Indicatorst + ls + est
where ls represents the state fixed effects and est is an independently
and identically distributed error term. If the late-term restrictions
have a chilling effect on abortion in the surrounding periods, the
coefficient on Late Term Restriction, b1, should be negative. For comparison purposes, we also substitute for %16–20 weeks the percentage
of abortions after twenty weeks, %>20 weeks, and the percentage
before sixteen weeks, %<16 weeks.43 In the first case, b1 should be
negative if the laws have their intended impact. In the last case, b1
should be positive if the laws induce women to shift the timing of
abortions towards the earlier part of their pregnancies.
As a supplement to these regressions, we have also analyzed several alternative specifications. First, we have substituted for Late Term
each revision of the relevant code section. We then examined any reported cases indicating
whether a late-term or partial-birth abortion restriction was enjoined.
43 For simplicity’s sake, we ran three separate regressions for the three equations. We
also analyzed a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model, which assumes the errors are
correlated across the three equations. These results are substantively identical to those in
the simpler specification.
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Restriction the two regressors Time Limit and Viability, so that we can
assess whether the hypothesized effects depend on the type of restriction. Second, we have analyzed specifications that substitute the
number for the percentage of abortions in each of three periods, and
in order to reduce the impact of outliers, we analyzed the natural log
of the total number. Unlike the zero-sum nature of the percentage
variables, whereby an increase in the percentage of abortions in a
given period means that the percentage in other periods must decline,
the number of abortions may increase or decrease across all three gestational periods simultaneously. Finally, we conducted several tests to
assess whether any observed chilling effects might be due to the publicity surrounding the passage of laws. Specifically, we compared the
impact from the year the law is passed to that in future years and
analyzed the effects of failed referenda. All of these additional analyses are presented following the main findings.44
III
RESULTS
Table 1 presents the results of Equation [1].45
TABLE 1. LATE TERM RESTRICTIONS AND ABORTION PERCENTAGES
BY GESTATIONAL STAGE
%16–20 Weeks

% >20 Weeks

% <16 Weeks

Late Term
Restriction

-0.669**
(0.204)

-0.581**
(0.005)

0.923**
(0.248)

Number of Providers

0.017**
(0.008)

0.004
(0.006)

-0.009
(0.009)

Pro-Life Opinion

-0.022
(0.016)

-0.022*
(0.012)

-0.002
(0.020)

Partial Birth
Restriction

0.069
(0.133)

-0.397**
(0.103)

0.324**
(0.161)

Constant

4.847**
(1.057)

2.658**
(0.826)

95.460**
(1.291)

Yes
Yes
777

Yes
Yes
785

Yes
Yes
793

Year Indicators
State Effects
N

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. ** signifies p<0.05, and * signifies
p<0.1, two-tailed.
44 In addition, we have run SUR models that assume the error terms are correlated
across the equations, and the results are substantively similar.
45 The sample sizes vary slightly across the specifications because some states reported
only a subset of the gestational ages for some years.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\90-4\NYU404.txt

1108

unknown

Seq: 14

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5-OCT-15

9:02

[Vol. 90:1095

The first row of results suggests that late-term abortion
restrictions reduce not only the percentage of abortions in the later
portion of the pregnancy, but also in the “near-late-term” period of
sixteen to twenty weeks. In each of these periods, the coefficient on
late-term restrictions is negative and statistically significant at p<0.05,
two-tailed. The percentage of abortions in weeks sixteen to twenty,
relative to the total number of abortions, is approximately 0.7
percentage points lower when a state switches from having no
restrictions to having some. Similarly, the percentage of late-term
abortions themselves declines by 0.6 percentage points.46 By
comparison, the percentage of abortions in the earlier portion of the
pregnancy increases. The coefficient on Late Term Restrictions in
Column 3 is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the
late-term restrictions induce women to seek abortions earlier in the
term.
Notably, all of these effects for late-term restrictions derive from
within-state changes, as the fixed effects model holds the state
constant. Within the years of the data, eight of the states changed their
laws: Alabama, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Texas,
Utah, and Washington. The identification therefore derives from these
eight states.
The control variables in Table 1 do not present any major
surprises. Partial-birth restrictions reduce the percentage of abortions
in the late term, and shift them to the early period. Finally, pro-life
opinion is significant at conventional levels in the post-twenty weeks
regression, and here again the direction is expected; as the public
becomes increasingly pro-life, the percentage of late-term abortions
will decline, independent of the official policy. Finally, the controls
indicate that the number of providers is associated with an increase in
the percentage of early-term abortions. This relationship may exist
because some providers only offer early-term abortions, such as
providers who offer medically induced but not surgical abortions.47
46 It is somewhat surprising that the relative effect of late-term abortion restrictions
appears to be slightly greater in the near-late-term than in the late term itself. One
potential reason is that the partial-birth abortion bans, which only have a significant impact
on late term abortions but not near-late-term ones, are effective at reducing late term
abortions even when they are not explicitly banned. Moreover, if one tests for the
statistical significance of the difference in an SUR model, one finds it is not at all
significant (p>0.85).
47 For instance, in 2008, 9% of providers offered medically induced but not surgical
abortions. See Rachel K. Jones & Kathryn Kooistra, Abortion Incidence and Access to
Services in the United States, 2008, 43 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 41, 46 (2011)
(“A substantial number of clinics and physicians’ offices—164 facilities, or 9% of all
providers—offered early medication abortions, but not surgical abortions . . . .”).
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TIME LIMITS

%16–20 Weeks

% >20 Weeks

% <16 Weeks

Time Limit

-0.899**
(0.285)

-0.424*
(0.222)

0.912**
(0.343)

Viability

-0.589**
(0.215)

-0.636**
(0.169)

0.926**
(0.260)

Number of Providers

0.017**
(0.008)

0.005
(0.006)

-0.009
(0.009)

Pro-Life Opinion

-0.021
(0.016)

-0.022*
(0.013)

-0.002
(0.012)

Partial Birth
Restriction

0.078
(0.134)

-0.391**
(0.104)

0.324**
(0.161)

Constant

4.853**
(1.057)

2.655**
(0.826)

95.463**
(0.343)

Yes
Yes
777

Yes
Yes
785

Yes
Yes
793

Year Indicators
State Effects
N

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. ** signifies p<0.05 and * signifies
p<0.1, two-tailed.

Table 2 shows that the major conclusions of Table 1 are similar if
we split late-term restrictions into those concerning time limits versus
the viability of the fetus. Each type of restriction significantly reduces
near-late-term abortions, i.e. those in the sixteen- to twenty-week
period. Time limits are associated with a 0.9 percentage point decline,
and viability laws with a 0.6 percentage decline. This difference in the
magnitudes is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p>0.1,
two-tailed), suggesting that the type of late-term restriction is less
consequential than simply whether one has been enacted.
The results for the late and early periods of the pregnancy also
suggest that the impact of late restrictions does not depend
substantially on the type of restriction. Viability laws reduce the
proportion of late-term abortions by 0.6 percentage points, while time
limits reduce them by 0.4 percentage points. The proportion of earlyterm abortions increases by 0.9 percentage points if the state has a
viability law and also by 0.9 percentage points with a time limit. In
neither case is the difference between the types of restriction
significant.
Theoretically, a new law could drive down abortions in all
gestational periods, even if the proportions among the three periods
changed significantly. Or, abortions could increase across all periods,
and yet the proportion in weeks sixteen through twenty could decline
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relative to the other two periods. Accordingly, Table 3 investigates
whether the results are corroborated by the total number of abortions
in each period. We are particularly interested in whether a decline in
the near-late-term period is associated with a decline in the total
number of abortions.
TABLE 3. NUMBER

OF

ABORTIONS

Ln(16–20
Weeks)

Ln(>20
Weeks)

Ln(<16
Weeks)

Late Term
Restriction

-0.219**
(0.091)

-0.452**
(0.160)

0.090
(0.056)

Number of Providers

0.008**
(0.003)

0.005
(0.006)

-0.004*
(0.002)

Pro-Life Opinion

0.372
(0.719)

0.041**
(0.013)

-0.158
(0.444)

Partial Birth
Restriction

0.094
(0.060)

0.173
(0.104)

0.091
(0.036)

Constant

4.913**
(0.472)

0.651
(0.827)

8.955**
(0.289)

Yes
Yes
777

Yes
Yes
785

Yes
Yes
793

Year Indicators
State Effects
N

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. ** signifies p<0.05 and * signifies
p<0.1, two-tailed.

As Table 3 shows, it is indeed associated with such a decline.
When a state introduces a late-term restriction, the number of
abortions drops significantly in not only the gestational period to
which the law is directed, but also weeks sixteen through twenty.
Interpreting the magnitude of the coefficients is not
straightforward given that the dependent variable is a natural log. If
we take four hundred abortions as the baseline number for a given
state, year, and gestational age, then the results in Table 3 suggest that
a late-term restriction decreases the number in the sixteen to twenty
week period to 321 per year. The impact in the post-twenty week
period, not surprisingly, is also statistically significant and even larger
in magnitude. Using the same baseline, a late-term restriction reduces
the number of abortions of fetuses older than twenty weeks to
approximately 255 a year.
Interestingly, the impact on the early term is not significant at
conventional levels (p>0.1, two-tailed) and is small in magnitude.
Table 3 thus indicates that the number of abortions in the early period
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does not go up significantly when a late-term restriction is enacted.
We know from Tables 1 and 2 that the proportion of abortions shifts
to the earlier period, but Table 3 indicates this is simply due to the fact
that fewer abortions are performed in the middle and later parts of
the pregnancy, rather than a significant increase in the number
performed for early-term pregnancies. Women are thus either going
out of state to seek an abortion or are choosing to carry their
pregnancies to term.
A potential concern with the findings is that the publicity
surrounding the enactment of the laws could alter the behavior of
physicians and women independent of the laws themselves. We
therefore conducted two types of supplemental analyses to assess
whether the observed effects are largely a function of publicity.
First, we created a variable Passage Years, which equals 1 if a
late-term restriction became law in that state in the current or
previous year. If what we are interpreting as a chilling effect occurs
only in the years surrounding the passage of the law, then presumably
they are not indicative of a chilling effect but may instead be caused
by the publicity surrounding the new law.
Second, we also analyzed failed and enjoined laws to see if the
effects are comparable to those of the laws that succeed in the
legislative and judicial processes. If the unsuccessful policy efforts
have as much of an impact on abortions as the actual reforms, then
the impact cannot be due to the reforms themselves. The variable
Unsuccessful Reforms equals 1 if there was a failed abortion
referendum in a given state in that year or the previous year. We
included all referenda explicitly concerning late-term abortions as well
as broad abortion prohibitions that would have eliminated late-term
abortions.48 There were eight such failed referenda across seven states
within our data. Additionally, Unsuccessful Reforms equals 1 if a lateterm restriction was enjoined, which occurs only four times in the
data, each in a different state. In all other cases, Unsuccessful Reforms
equals 0.49
Table 4 shows that neither case suggests that publicity is driving
the results we interpret as a chilling effect.
48 We use the referenda identified in Samantha E. Holquist, Direct Democracy and the
Politics of Abortion: Evaluating the Responsiveness of State Abortion Policy to State
Abortion Attitudes, 21 POL’Y PERSP. 60, 62, 74–75 (2014) and Jongho Roh & Donald P.
Haider-Markel, All Politics Is Not Local: National Forces in State Abortion Initiatives, 84
SOC. SCI. Q. 15, 30–31 (2003).
49 We have analyzed the enjoined laws and referenda separately, and the results are
substantively similar. Because there are so few enjoined laws regarding the late-term
restrictions, interpreting a null result from this finding alone would arguably be
problematic.
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TABLE 4. PUBLICITY VERSUS CHILLING EFFECTS
%16–20
Weeks

%16–20
Weeks

% >20
Weeks

% >20
Weeks

% <16
Weeks

% <16
Weeks

Late Term
Restriction

-0.669**
(0.204)

-0.705**
(0.205)

-0.580**
(0.158)

-0.566**
(0.161)

0.915**
(0.248)

0.961**
(0.250)

Passage Years

0.211
(0.265)

—

0.696**
(0.207)

—

-0.732**
(0.320)

—

Unsuccessful
Reform

—

-0.354
(0.243)

—

0.138
(0.182)

—

0.363
(0.293)

Number of
Providers

0.017**
(0.008)

0.075
(0.134)

0.004
(0.006)

0.005
(0.006)

-0.008
(0.008)

-0.009
(0.008)

Pro-Life
Opinion

-0.022
(0.016)

-0.023
(0.016)

-0.021*
(0.013)

-0.022
(0.013)

-0.003
(0.020)

-0.002
(0.020)

Partial Birth
Restriction

0.068
(0.134)

-0.075
(0.134)

-0.392**
(0.103)

-0.394**
(0.104)

0.327**
(0.160)

0.330**
(0.161)

Constant

4.832**
(1.058)

4.943**
(1.059)

2.612**
(0.820)

2.620**
(0.828)

95.509**
(1.287)

95.365**
(1.292)

Yes
Yes
777

Yes
Yes
777

Yes
Yes
785

Yes
Yes
785

Yes
Yes
793

Yes
Yes
793

Year Indicators
State Effects
N

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. ** signifies p<0.05 and * signifies
p<0.1, two-tailed.

The main findings on the late-term restrictions are similar in magnitude and significance to those in Table 1. Moreover, the impact of a
passage year or unsuccessful reform is insignificant in all but two
cases, and in those cases the effect is in the opposite direction than
would be expected if publicity was driving the earlier findings. For
abortions in the post-twenty week period, passage years are associated
with a significant increase in abortions in the post-twenty week period
and decrease in the early period. Because passage years include the
period leading up to passage and before the law goes into effect, it is
possible that some women considering a late-term abortion proceed to
get one quickly before the law prohibits them from doing so.
Table 4 concerns the percentage of abortions for each gestational
period, but the results are similar if instead we examine the log total
number of abortions in each period. Again, the main results on lateterm restrictions mimic those in Table 1. And, again, the effects of the
passage years and unsuccessful reforms are insignificant with the
exception of late-term abortions in the passage years, where the effect
is in the opposite direction than if publicity were leading to fewer
abortions. Overall, the supplemental analysis indicates that the effects
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of late-term restrictions on near-late-term abortions are not due to the
publicity surrounding the passage of the laws, but instead are due to
the laws themselves.
DISCUSSION

AND

CONCLUSION

The foregoing results indicate that late-term abortion restrictions
chill near-late-term abortions. The data do not permit us to distinguish
between provider effects and patient effects, but both are possibly in
play. Abortion restrictions target physicians, often with severe penalties,50 and so the most natural analogue to the chilling effect of a law
targeting speech on speakers is the chilling effect of a law targeting
the performance of late abortions on the doctors who would be performing those abortions.
Insofar as late-term abortion restrictions chill doctors’ willingness
to perform near-late-term abortions, they limit women’s access to
such constitutionally protected near-late-term abortions. We interpret
this reduction in access as implicating constitutional rights, regardless
of the relative proportions of the affected women who are consequently carrying their pregnancies to term versus those who are traveling to other states (or countries) to obtain abortions. As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held in the
course of invalidating a Mississippi abortion law that “effectively will
close its only abortion clinic,” a state “may not shift its obligation to
respect the established constitutional rights of its citizens to another
state.”51 To be sure, in addressing a challenge to a Texas law, a different Fifth Circuit panel subsequently appeared to narrow that precedent in a ruling that was itself then stayed by the Supreme Court.52
Yet whatever its exact scope, the principle of the Mississippi case is
sound. The courts would not sustain a law that abridged freedom of
50 In addition to focusing on providers in the wording of punishment statutes, states
often specifically exempt the women upon whom abortions are performed from
punishment. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.01 (2010) (“This section shall not
subject a woman upon whom a partial-birth abortion is performed to any criminal
prosecution or civil liability.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.151 (West 2006) (“A
pregnant woman upon whom a partial birth procedure is performed in violation of division
(B) or (C) of this section is not guilty of committing, attempting to commit, complicity in
the commission of, or conspiracy in the commission of a violation of those divisions.”);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-209 (2014) (“A woman upon whom a partial-birth abortion is
performed may not be prosecuted under this section for violating this section or any of its
provisions, or for conspiracy to violate this section or any of its provisions.”).
51 Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 449 (5th Cir. 2014).
52 See Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 596–98 (5th Cir.) (holding that the
Jackson Women’s Health Org. principle does not apply where state law does not
completely shunt its responsibility onto neighboring states or to multistate metropolitan
areas), modified, 790 F.3d 598 (5th Cir.), mandate stayed, 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015).
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speech on the ground that people could travel to neighboring states to
exercise their right to free speech; First Amendment doctrine would
invalidate the law based on its in-state impact.
Our results partly vindicate the intuition underlying the Supreme
Court’s overbreadth doctrine and other doctrines grounded on a chilling effect. We find that overbroad laws affect not only the unprotected conduct they (perhaps permissibly) target, but also discourage
protected conduct outside of their direct ambit. The chilling effect is
real.
Our results also undermine the claim that only free speech rights
are susceptible to a chilling effect. At least one other constitutional
right—abortion—is subject to a chilling effect. Further research might
profitably investigate whether other constitutional rights are also
vulnerable.

